fl£cf£ci*a<K{*. If any will needs attribute some kind of apprehension or *sense* to nature, then it must not be such a sense or apprehension* as is in animals, but something that differs as much from it, as the sense or cogitation of one in a profound sleep differs from that of one who is awake. — And since it cannot be denied, but that the plastic nature hath a certain dull and obscure idea of that, which it stamps and prints upon matter, the same philosopher* himself sticks not to call this idea of nature, fllajua and (MptyMi, a spectacle and contemplamen, as likewise the energy of nature towards it, feupta a^o^oc, a silent contemplation; •^nay, he allows, thai nature may be said to be* in some sense, ^Aofe-a/*c*n/, a lover of spectacles or contemplation.—

17. However, that there may be some vital energy without clear and express <rw«V6vKc* con-sense and consciousness, animadversion, attention, or self-perception, seems reasonable upon several accounts. For, first, those philosophers themselves, who make the essence of the soul to consist in cogitation, and again, the essence of cogitation in clear and express * consciousness, cannot render it any way probable, that the souls of men in all profound sleeps, lethargies, tod apoplexies, as also of embryos in the womb, from their very first arrival thither, are meirer so much as one moment without expressly conscious cogitations; which, if they were, according to the principles of tfaeir philosophy, they must, *ip$o fa&to,* cease to have any being. Now, if the souls of raea and animals be at any time without con-

*** Ubt supra***